The Copenhagen Document: Interventionin Support of Democracy by Halberstam, Malvina
Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law 
LARC @ Cardozo Law 
Articles Faculty 
1993 
The Copenhagen Document: Interventionin Support of Democracy 
Malvina Halberstam 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, halbrstm@yu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Malvina Halberstam, The Copenhagen Document: Interventionin Support of Democracy, 34 Harvard 
International Law Journal 163 (1993). 
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/344 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information, 
please contact christine.george@yu.edu, ingrid.mattson@yu.edu. 
VOLUME 34, NUMBER I, WINTER 1993 
The Copenhagen Document: Intervention 
in Support of Democracy 
Malvina Halberstam• 
I. THE COPENHAGEN DOCUMENT 
The Copenhagen Document, 1 one of a series of instruments adopted 
by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), is 
clearly one of the great documents in the history and development of 
human rights and international law. 2 Both its breadth and detail are 
extraordinary: its provisions on human rights;3 on minority rights;4 
its condemnation of anti-Semitism;5 its condemnation of torture. 6 The 
progress that has been made in the international protection of human 
rights, at least at the theoretical level, is particulary impressive when 
one considers that for centuries the accepted doctrine was that only 
states-not individuals-are subjects of international law. Indeed, for 
years after the U.N. Charter was adopted some members of the United 
Nations argued that even discussion of a state's human rights violations 
was prohibited by article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.7 In the United 
States, the American Bar Association not so long ago took the position 
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. This Comment 
is based in part on a paper presented at an ABA Conference on The Rule of Law in United 
States Foreign Policy and the New World Order, held in Washington, D.C. , October 10-11, 
1991. The author wishes to thank Esther Gueft, Cardozo '93, for her assistance with the research 
for this paper. 
I. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), June 29, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 
1305 (1990) [hereinafter Copenhagen Document]. The Conference on the Human Dimension 
of the CSCE was an outgrowth of the Helsinki Final Act (HFA). For an excellent review of the 
several meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE and the documents 
adopted , see Thomas Buergenthal, The CSCE Rights System, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & 
ECON. 333 (1991). 
2. The Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
Honorable Steny H . Hoyer, characterized the Copenhagen Document as the Magna Carta of the 
law of engagement. Conference Stresses "Rule of Engagement" in United States Foreign Policy , 13 NAT"L 
SECURITY L. REP., Oct . 1991 , at I. 
3. Copenhagen Document, supra note l , paras. 5.7 , 10-11.3. 
4 . Id. paras. 30-39. 
5. Id. para. 40. 
6 . Id. paras. 16-16. 7. 
7. U.N . CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 states: '"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state .. .... 
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that the United States could not ratify the Genocide Convention8 
because it dealt with matters within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
United States. 9 No one today would suggest that the subjects dealt 
with by the Copenhagen Document are not proper subjects of inter-
national law. 10 
Many of the rights referred to in the Copenhagen Document are 
also found in earlier instruments such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 11 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights , 12 the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination , 13 and the Convention Against Tor-
ture . 14 What is unique_ in the Copenhagen Document is that it asserts 
(1) that the protection of human rights is one of the basic purposes of 
government, (2) that a freely elected representative government is 
essential for the protection of human rights and (3) that states have a 
responsibility to protect democratically elected governments-their 
own and other states'-if they are threatened by acts of violence or 
terrorism. Thus, the Copenhagen Document provides: 
( 1) The participating States express their conviction that the 
protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental free-
doms is one of the basic purposes of government, and reaffirm 
that the recognition of these rights and freedoms constitutes the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace . 
(2) ... They consider that the rule of law does not mean merely 
a formal legality ... but justice based on the recognition and full 
acceptance of the supreme value of the human personality and 
8 . Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9 , 1948, 
78 U.N .T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). 
9 . See MALVINA HALBERSTAM & ELIZABETH F. DEFEIS, WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS: INTER-
NATIONAL COVENANTS, AN ALTERNATIVE TO ERA? 50-52 (1987). 
10. For example, the Moscow Document, adopted October 3, 1991 , specifically provides: 
The participating States emphasize that issues relating to human rights, fundamental 
freedoms , democracy and the rule of law are of international concern, as respect for these 
rights and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the international order. They 
categorically and irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the 
human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all partici-
pating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned. 
Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 
pmbl. , para. 9, reprinted in , 30 I.L.M. 1670 (1991) [hereinafter Moscow Document}. See a/Jo 
statement quoted infra note 49. 
11. G.A. Res . 217A (III), U.N . GAOR, 3d Sess. , U.N . Doc. A/810 (1948) . 
12 . 999 U.N.T.S. 17 1, 61.L.M. 368 (1967), G .A. Res . 2200 (XXI), U.N . GAOR, 21st. 
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52 , U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
13 . 660 U.N .T.S. 195 , 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966), G .A. Res. 2106, U.N . GAOR, 21st . Sess., 
Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). 
14. Annex G .A. Res. 46, U .N . GAOR, 39th Sess. , Supp. No. 51, at 197 , U.N . Doc. A/ 
39151 (1984) , a1 modifad, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985). 
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guaranteed by institutions providing a framework for its fullest 
express10n. 
(5) . .. Among those elements of justice which are essential to 
the full expression of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all human beings are . . . : 
(5 . 1) Free elections . . . held at reasonable intervals by secret 
ballot ... ; 
(5.2) A form of government that is representative in character, 
in which the executive is accountable to the elected legislature or 
the electorate; 
(6) The participating states declare that the will of the people, 
freely and fairly expressed through periodic and genuine elections, 
is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government 
. . . They recognize their responsibility to defend and protect 
. . . the democratic order freely established through the will of 
the people against the activities of persons, groups or organiza-
tions that engage in or refuse to renounce terrorism or violence 
aimed at the overthrow of that order or of that of another partici-
pating state. 15 
Paragraph 7 spells out in considerable detail what steps states must 
take "to ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the 
authority of government." These include free elections at reasonable 
intervals; at least one chamber elected by popular vote; universal 
suffrage; secret ballot; the right to form political parties; the right to 
campaign; access to the media; and the obligation to "ensure that 
candidates who obtain the necessary number of votes required by law 
are duly installed in office and are permitted to remain in office until 
their term expires . "16 
15. Copenhagen Document, supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
16. Paragraph 7 provides: 
(T}o ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government, 
the participating States will 
(7 . 1) -hold free elections at reasonable intervals, as established by law; 
(7 .2) -permit all seats in at least one chamber of the national legislature co be freely 
contested in a popular vote; 
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While not a treaty, the Copenhagen Document, adopted by thirty-
five countries, represents the views of most of the major powers of the 
free world and of what used to be the communist world. 17 These states 
affirmed, in the clearest terms possible, that the promotion of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the basic purposes of 
government, that freely elected governments are essential for the 
protection of those rights, and that the participating states have a 
responsibility to defend such governments against violence and 
terrorism. 
II. THE OBLIGATION TO PROTECT FREELY ELECTED 
GOVERNMENTS AGAINST OVERTHROW 
As noted, paragraph 6 provides that the participating states "rec-
ognize their responsibility to defend and protect . . . the democratic 
order freely established through the will of the people" against "ter-
rorism or violence aimed at the overthrow of that order or of that of 
another participating state." The question arises whether this provision 
of the Copenhagen Document authorizes one state to intervene and if 
(7 .3) -guarantee universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens; 
(7 .4) --ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, 
and that they are counted and reported honestly with the official results made public; 
(7 .5) -respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as 
representatives of political parties or organizations, without discrimination; 
(7 .6) -respect the right of individuals and groups to establish, in full freedom, their own 
political parties or other political organizations and provide such political parties and 
organizations with the necessary legal guarantees to enable them to compete with each 
other on a basis of equal treatment before the law and by the authorities; 
(7 . 7) --ensure that law and public policy work to permit political campaigning to be 
conducted in a fair and free atmosphere in which neither administrative action, violence 
nor intimidation bars the parties and the candidates from freely presenting their views and 
qualifications, or prevents the voters from learning and discussing them or from casting 
their vote free of fear of retribution; 
(7. 8) -provide that no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded 
access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals 
wishing to participate in the electoral process; 
(7 . 9) --ensure that candidates who obtain the necessary number of votes required by law 
are duly installed in office and are permitted to remain in office until their term expires or 
is otherwise brought to an end in a manner that is regulated by law in conformity with 
democratic parliamentary and constitutional procedures. 
Copenhagen Document, supra note 1. 
17. The "participating states" in the Copenhagen Conference included the countries of 
Western Europe, the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. 
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necessary to use force to protect a freely elected government in another 
state. A strong argument can be made that the Copenhagen Document 
does provide such authorization-that if ( 1) there is a freely elected 
government, and (2) it is either barred from taking office or deposed 
by violent means, other states have not only a right but a responsibility 
to restore it to power and, if necessary, to use force to that end. The 
language of paragraph 6 suggests that states are authorized to take 
whatever steps are necessary to "defend and protect" the democratic 
order of participating states. While paragraph 6 does not specifically 
authorize the use of force, neither does it prohibit the use of force . 
The participating states must have been aware that force may be 
necessary to "defend and protect ... against the activities of persons, 
groups or organizations that engage in ... terrorism or violence." 
Is such use of force consistent with the prohibition contained in 
article 2( 4) of the U. N . Charter? That article prohibits "the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations. "18 Clearly, intervention at the request of a freely elected 
government in danger of being overthrown would not constitute a 
violation of article 2(4). However, even if the freely elected government 
does not request assistance---for example, it may not be able to com-
municate with foreign governments or it may fear that such a request 
would endanger the lives of the elected officials or of others 19-a 
strong argument can be made that forcible intervention would not 
violate the U .N . Charter. If elections are held, the legally elected 
government is deposed by violence (internal or external), and a second 
state intervenes, removes those who deposed the legally elected gov-
ernment, restores that government and withdraws, leaving the legit-
imate government in charge, the second state has not acted against 
but in support of the "territorial integrity" and "political indepen-
dence" of a state. 20 Nor is action restoring the freely elected govern-
ment "otherwise inconsistent with the purposes of the United Na-
tions." Restoration of the freely elected government furthers one of 
the fundamental purposes of the Charter, the promotion of human 
rights, and is a vindication of one of the principles affirmed in the 
Charter, self-determination, as originally defined by Woodrow Wil-
18. U.N . CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (emphasis added) . 
19. See, e.g. , Abraham D. Sofaer, The Legality of United States Aaion in Panama, 29 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 290 (1991) (noting that if the United States had obtained the Panamanian 
president's approval prior to entering Panama, the president himself might have been subjected 
to severe political and physical risks) . 
20. Cf Anthony D'Amato, The b111a1ion of Panama WaJ a Lawful Respome to Tyranny, 84 AM. 
J. iNT'L L. 516, 520 (1990). 
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son-"governments derive all their just powers from the consent of 
the governed. "21 
Some publicists have taken the pos1t1on that any use of force by 
one state in the territory of another violates article 2(4) of the Charter. 
Professor Henkin, for example, has argued that "the Charter ... 
prohibits the use of armed force by one state on the territory of another 
... for any purpose, in any circumstances. "22 One of his arguments 
in support of an absolute prohibition on the use of force is that "[w}ar 
inflict[s} the greatest injustice, the most serious violation of human 
rights . . . . "23 This argument is open to challenge on two grounds. 
An empirical study shows that the most serious violation of human 
rights, the denial of life itself, is inflicted to a far greater extent by 
totalitarian governments than by war. Professor Rummel found that 
"while about 37,000,000 people have been killed in battle in all 
foreign and domestic wars in our century, government democide (gen-
ocide and mass murder) have killed over 148,074,000 ... and over 
85 percent of these were killed by totalitarian governments. "24 Sec-
ondly, even if the proposition that war inflicts the most serious vio-
lation of human rights were empirically correct, historians generally 
agree that democratic states are less likely to be involved in war than 
totalitarian states. In fact, in the last 150 years no liberal democracies 
have fought against each other. 25 Thus, even if one accepts the position 
that every intrusion into the territory of another state is technically a 
violation of that state's territorial sovereignty, one may reasonably take 
the position that such a temporary violation of the state's territorial 
sovereignty is justified by its purpose: the restoration of the demo-
cratically elected government. 
Furthermore, the position that the prohibition on the use of force 
is content neutral, 26 that the U. N. Charter condemns equally the use 
of force in support of the most despotic dictator and the use of force 
21. Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), in 40 THE PAPERS OF 
WOODROW WILSON 533, 537 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1982). 
22 . Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S . Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 39-40 (Council on Foreign Relations ed., 1989). 
23. Id. at 39 . Professor Henkin makes the historical observation chat 
[t}he Charter reflected universal agreement chat the status quo prevailing at the end of 
World War II was not to be changed by force. Even justified grievances and a sincere 
concern for "national security" or ocher "vital interests" would not warrant any nation's 
initiating war. Peace was the paramount value .... War was inherently unjust . 
Id. at 38-39. 
24. R.J . Rummel , The Rule of Law: Towards Eliminating War and Democide 4 (unpublished 
paper on file with the American Bar Association Committee on Law and National Security). 
25 . See Franck, infra note 32; Rummel , supra note 24. 
26. See Henkin , supra note 22, at 62-63 ("[w}ith respect co the use of force , the Charter is 
neutral between democracy and totalitarianism"). See also Oscar Schachter, In Defeme of Interna-
tional Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 138 (1986). 
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in support of a freely elected government27--or those seeking to 
establish a freely elected government-has never been fully accepted. 
Proponents of the Reagan Doctrine, for example, have argued that it 
is legitimate for the United States to give 
support-including military support-for insurgencies under cer-
tain circumstances: where there are indigenous opponents to a 
government that is maintained by force, rather than popular 
consent; where such a government depends on arms supplied by 
the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc, or other foreign sources; and 
where the people are denied a choice regarding their affiliations 
and future. 28 
Professor Reisman argues that, 
[t}here is neither need nor justification for treating in a mechan-
ically equal fashion Tanzania's intervention in Uganda to over-
throw Amin's despotism, on the one hand, and Soviet intervention 
in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1966 to overthrow 
popular governments and to impose an undesired regime on a 
coerced population, on the other. 
. . . The critical question in a decentralized system is not 
whether coercion has been applied, but whether it has been 
applied in support of or against community order and basic 
policies, and whether it was applied in ways whose net conse-
quences include increased congruence with community goals and 
minimum order. 
Interpretation of a constitutive instrument requires principles 
and procedures that achieve, in ways appropriate to the context 
and consistent with the need for community order, the funda-
mental policies of the instrument as a whole. In the construction 
of Article 2(4), attention must always be given to the spirit of 
the Charter and not simply to the letter of a particular provision. 29 
The Copenhagen Document does not go as far as the Reagan Doc-
trine, nor as far as Professor Reisman. It does not contemplate the use 
27. Henkin states: 
International law provides no more basis for permitting the export of democracy by force 
than for permitting the export of socialism by force . As a matter of law, one cannot justify 
the U .S. action in Grenada or support for the Contras and condemn the Soviet Union's 
role in Czechoslovakia. 
Henkin, 111pra note 22, at 56. 
28. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, Human RightJ and International 
Law, in RIGHT V. MIGHT, 111pra note 22, at 20. 
29. W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Comtruing Charter Article 2(4), 78 
AM.) . INT'L L. 642 , 644-45 (1984) . 
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of force to topple a repressive regime, but applies only when a gov-
ernment has already been freely elected and is either barred from 
taking office or deposed by the use of force. Paragraph 6 speaks of the 
responsibility to "defend and protect" the democratic order against 
those who would "overthrow" it. 30 Thus, it is only after the people of 
a state have decided that they want a freely elected government, and 
have implemented that decisiori by holding elections, that other states 
have the right, or in the words of the Copenhagen Document the 
"responsibility," to protect it. 
This more limited approach avoids what Professor Schachter presents 
as a "fundamental reason" for his opposition to Reisman's position, 
namely, 
that it is incompatible with the concept of a pluralist society of 
independent states to allow states to attack each other in order to 
impose a particular form of government. It is no answer to this 
to maintain that force should be allowed only to bring about a 
goal, such as self-determination, which all states profess to accept. 
According to Schachter, such a position ignores 
the realities of a world deeply divided about the meaning of 
democracy and self-determination. Powerful states would be given 
a virtually unlimited right to overthrow governments alleged to 
be unresponsive to the "true" will of the people. One side's favored 
test of self-rule would not be acceptable to the other side .31 
Where, however, the state has already held elections and the elected 
government is prevented from taking office or deposed by threat or 
violence, the form of government is not being imposed on the state; 
the state itself has already chosen its form of government. Nor would 
states be given an "unlimited right to overthrow governments" under 
this approach; and there would be no need to choose between tests of 
self rule since, by hypothesis, the state has already made the choice. 
In his seminal article The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 32 
Professor Thomas Franck argues for a customary international law 
right to a democratically elected government. He traces the develop-
ment of the right in various legal instruments and suggests that "the 
refusal to permit demonstrably free elections" is increasingly becoming 
30. The Moscow Document similarly refers to the "'overthrow or attempted overthrow of a 
legitimately elected government ." Moscow Document, supra note 10, para. 17 .2. 
31. Schachter, supra note 26, at 144. 
32. Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Dem«ratic Governance, 86 AM. J. lNT'L L. 46 
(1992). 
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recognized as a breach of international law. 33 Franck would, however, 
permit "enforcement measures such as sanction, blockade, or military 
intervention in limited circumstances," only if authorized by the U .N. 
Security Council. 34 
The rule proposed here, based on the Copenhagen Document, is 
both narrower and broader than the position advocated by Franck's 
article. It is narrower in that it authorizes intervention in support of 
democracy only where a state has already opted for a freely elected 
government and the government so elected was either prevented from 
taking office or deposed by the use of force. Franck, on the other 
hand, considers enforcement measures permissible whenever a state 
refuses "to permit demonstrably free elections or to implement their 
results. "35 It should be noted that although the rule proposed is 
narrower than Franck's, it is by no means insignificant. According to 
Franck "there are more than 110 governments ... legally committed 
to permitting open, multiparty, secret-ballot elections with a universal 
franchise . "36 As recent events in Panama and Haiti demonstrate, these 
commitments are often ignored:· In Panama, the democratically elected 
government was prevented from taking office;37 in Haiti, the elected 
President was deposed by force. 38 Thus, the rule proposed would 
hardly lack for application. 
The rule proposed is broader than Franck's in that it does not limit 
enforcement to measures authorized by the U.N. Security Council. 
Franck's opposition to unilateral intervention and insistence on U.N. 
action is based more on political considerations-the need to allay the 
fears of small states of abuse by powerful states-than on provisions 
in the instruments he cites in support of a right to democratic gov-
ernance. 39 Franck writes: 
That a new rule might authorize actions to enforce democracy 
still conjures up .. . chilling images to weaker states, which see 
33. Id. at 85. Franck states: '"It is no longer arguable that the United Nations cannot exert 
pressure against governments that oppress their own peoples by egregious racism, denials of self-
determination and suppression of freedom of expression. That litany is being augmented by new 
sins: refusals to permit demonstrably free elections or to implement their results." Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 47. 
37. Panama Election Voided Amid ChargeJ of G011m1mtnt Fraud, Fortign Inttroention; U .S . Bttfi 
Up Military Presence, Facts on File World News Digest, at 329, Al , May 12, 1989, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Facts File; Panama: Mood Tense But Calm as Panamaniam Await Election 
Ruults, Inter Press Service, May 8, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpress File. 
38. Leftist Priest Wim Presidency, Facts on File World News Digest, at 954, A3, Dec. 21, 
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Facts File. 
39. Franck, supra note 32, at 85 . 
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themselves as potential objects of enforcement of dubious demo-
cratic norms under circumstances of doubtful probity. 40 
That fear, he believes, would deter states from agreeing to international 
monitoring of their elections, which he considers essential. He states: 
The coherence of the democratic entitlement ultimately will de-
pend on whether most states, most of the time, freely agree to 
be monitored: whether, in short, the process is perceived as 
legitimate. To achieve this normative coherence, monitoring will 
have to be uncoupled, in the clearest fashion, from a long history 
of unilateral enforcement of a tainted, colonialist "civilizing" 
mission. If the duty to be monitored is to develop as customary 
law, it must be reconciled in the minds of governments with 
their residual sovereignty. This · requires that all states unambig-
uously renounce the use of unilateral, or even regional, military 
force to compel compliance with the democratic entitlement in 
the absence of prior Security Council authorization under chapter 
VII of the Charter; 
. . . To obtain the general consent necessary to render the 
denial of democracy a cognizable violation of an international 
community standard, it must be understood that whatever coun-
termeasures are taken must first be authorized collectively by the 
appropriate U .N. institutions. Collective action-so the tremu-
lous must understand and the powerful aver-is not a substitute 
for, but the opposite of, unilateral enforcement. 41 
However, as noted earlier, Franck himself acknowledges that over a 
hundred states have already opted for freely elected governments42 and 
a number have requested international monitoring of their elections. 43 
Yet, "all states" have not "unambiguously renounce(d} the use of 
unilateral or even regional military force to compel compliance," as 
Franck urges. Thus, his concern that fear of unilateral intervention 
would cause states to refrain from opting for democratically elected 
governments seems unfounded. Insofar as monitoring of elections is 
concerned, states that wish to invite an international group to monitor 
their elections but fear that a concomitant of such monitoring will be 
unwanted enforcement by powerful states can declare that they want 
no action taken without U.N. authorization. Absent such a declara-
tion, the test of lawfulness of the action taken should depend not on 
40. Id. at 84. 
4 I. Id. at 84- 85 (emphasis in original). 
42 . Set 1upra text at note 36. 
43. Franck, 1upra note 32, at 74-75. 
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whether it is authorized by the United Nations, but on whether it 
was intended to and did reinstate a freely elected government that 
was either prevented from taking power or overthrown by terrorism 
or violence. 
While permitting unilateral enforcement poses certain risks of 
abuse, limiting enforcement measures to those taken under U.N. 
auspices poses another risk-that no action will be taken at all. This 
risk was demonstrated by the U .N. response to the Idi Amin regime 
in Uganda. In spite of the horrors being perpetrated in that country,_ 
the United Nations failed to act, and ultimately it was the uni,lateral 
use of force by Tanzania, without U.N. authorization, that resulted 
in Amin's ouster. Significantly, after Amin was deposed, Uganda's 
new President complained not of Tanzania's unilateral action, but of 
the United Nations's failure to act. 44 It is by no means clear that 
unilateral use of force is the greater risk, nor is it clear that unilateral 
intervention in Uganda, Grenada, or Panama resulted in a greater 
denial of human rights or caused greater unhappiness among the 
peoples of these countries than did the failure to intervene in Biafra, 
Czechoslovakia, or Hungary. Probably, the opposite is true. Whatever 
abuses resulted from intervention by democracies would pale by com-
parison to the horrors perpetrated by totalitarian regimes that were 
permitted to continue in the name of non-intervention. 
It may be that with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United 
Nations will no longer be hampered by the veto power and will take 
an active role to protect the democratic order. But that is by no means 
certain. The situation in Russia, successor to the Soviet Union on the 
Security Council, is still unstable, and, of course, China also has the 
veto power. Significantly, the Copenhagen Document, which puts such 
great emphasis on freely elected governments, makes no reference to 
U.N. action. Rather, it speaks of the responsibility of the "partici-
pating states" to "defend and protect" the democratic order against 
those who would overthrow it by terrorism or violence. In the Paris 
Charter, adopted shortly after the Copenhagen Document, the partic-
ipating states agreed to "support each other with the aim of making 
democratic gains irreversible," again without making reference to the 
United Nations. 45 Moreover, Franck would permit the use of sanctions, 
including force if necessary, not only to protect and defend a freely 
elected government against overthrow, but to establish democratic 
governments. When there is no freely elected government to instate 
44. U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess. , at 269-71, UN Doc. A/34/Pv. 14, at 4-6 (1979) (Mr. 
Godfrey Lukongwa Binaisa, President of the Republic of Uganda) . 
45. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 
Nov. 21, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 193, 195 (1991) (emphasis added) . 
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or reinstate, the potential for abuse is, of course, much greater. 
According to the rule postulated above, permissible intervention is 
specifically limited to situations in which a state has opted for a freely 
elected government, a government has been elected, and the govern-
ment so elected has been barred from taking office or deposed by use 
of force . 
III. CONCLUSION 
In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice stated: 
The Court cannot contemplate the creation of a new rule opening 
up a right of intervention by one state against another on the 
ground that the latter has opted for some particular ideology or 
political system. 46 
The states that adopted the Copenhagen Document apparently dis-
agree. The Copenhagen Document is also a repudiation of the position 
urged by Henkin that whether force is used in support of democracy 
or of a dictatorship is irrelevant to its legality. The difference, as set 
forth in the Copenhagen Document, is that democracy-a freely 
elected government-is essential for the protection of human rights, 47 
and "the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms is one of the basic purposes of government. "48 The instru-
ments adopted by the Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
CSCE reject the position that there are no "universally recognized 
values higher than peace and the autonomy of states. "49 They affirm 
unequivocally that the protection of human rights and of democrati-
cally elected governments are higher values. While not treaties, these 
documents, adopted by the Conference on the Human Dimension of 
the CSCE, represent the views of most of the major world powers, the 
views of the free world and of what used to be the communist world. 
46. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 4, 131, para. 257 . The Court added, however, that "respondent had not advanced a legal 
argument based on an alleged new principle of ideological intervention." Id. 
47. Copenhagen Document, ,upra note 1, para. 5. 
48. Id. para. 1. 
49. Henkin, ,upra note 32 , at 44. In sharp contrast , the Deputy Foreign Minister of the 
former Soviet Union has stated that "the principle of non-interference , despite its importance, 
must not operate with regard to human rights and the observance of human rights. I would put 
it like this, that human rights and democracy must have supremacy over the principle of non-
interference." Statement by Y.S. Deryabin, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister, in an interview 
with V. Levin on All Union Radio, Radio 1 (Sept. 9, 1991), BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 
Sept. 11, 1991, at su/1174/Al/l (transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File). 
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They are, in the words of Professor Franck, "weighted with the 
terminology of opinio Juris" and "deliberate! y norm creating. "50 
In sum, if ( 1) free elections are held, (2) the government so elected 
is barred from taking office or deposed by use force, (3) another state 
or states intervene, restore the legitimate government, and 
(4) withdraw, that is not-and should not be-a violation of inter-
national law. The validity of that position does not depend on the 
Copenhagen Document alone. It can be justified by reference to the 
language of article 2( 4) of the U . N . Charter and the purposes of the 
Charter, as noted above. However, the emphasis in the Copenhagen 
Document on the importance of freely elected governments and on 
the responsibility of states to protect and defend the democratic order 
against those who would use violence and terrorism to overthrow that 
order, lends strong support to that position. 
50. Franck, ,,,pra note 32 , at 67 . 
